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ABSTRACT 
This chapter revises the most important aspects in how computing infrastructures should be configured 
and intelligently managed to fulfill the most notably security aspects required by Big Data applications. 
One of them is privacy. It is a pertinent aspect to be addressed because users share more and more 
personal data and content through their devices and computers to social networks and public clouds. So, 
a secure framework to social networks is a very hot topic research. This last topic is addressed in one of 
the two sections of the current chapter with case studies. In addition, the traditional mechanisms to 
support security such as firewalls and demilitarized zones are not suitable to be applied in computing 
systems to support Big Data. SDN is an emergent management solution that could become a convenient 
mechanism to implement security in Big Data systems, as we show through a second case study at the end 
of the chapter. This also discusses current relevant work and identifies open issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Big Data is an emerging area applied to manage datasets whose size is beyond the ability of 
commonly used software tools to capture, manage, and timely analyze that amount of data. The quantity 
of data to be analyzed is expected to double every two years (IDC, 2012). All these data are very often 
unstructured and from various sources such as social media, sensors, scientific applications, surveillance, 
video and image archives, Internet search indexing, medical records, business transactions and system 
logs. Big data is gaining more and more attention since the number of devices connected to the so-called 
“Internet of Things” (IoT) is still increasing to unforeseen levels, producing large amounts of data which 
needs to be transformed into valuable information. Additionally, it is very popular to buy on-demand 
additional computing power and storage from public cloud providers to perform intensive data-parallel 
processing. In this way, security and privacy issues can be potentially boosted by the volume, variety, and 
wide area deployment of the system infrastructure to support Big Data applications.  
As Big Data expands with the help of public clouds, traditional security solutions tailored to private 
computing infrastructures, confined to a well-defined security perimeter, such as firewalls and 
demilitarized zones (DMZs) are no more effective. Using Big Data, security functions are required to 
work over the heterogeneous composition of diverse hardware, operating systems, and network domains. 
In this puzzle-type computing environment, the abstraction capability of Software-Defined Networking 
(SDN) seems a very important characteristic that can enable the efficient deployment of Big Data secure 
services on-top of the heterogeneous infrastructure. SDN introduces abstraction because it separates the 
control (higher) plane from the underlying system infrastructure being supervised and controlled. 
Separating a network's control logic from the underlying physical routers and switches that forward traffic 
allows system administrators to write high-level control programs that specify the behavior of an entire 
network, in contrast to conventional networks, whereby administrators (if allowed to do it by the device 
manufacturers) must codify functionality in terms of low-level device configuration. Using SDN, the 
intelligent management of secure functions can be implemented in a logically centralized controller, 
simplifying the following aspects: implementation of security rules; system (re)configuration; and system 
evolution. The robustness drawback of a centralized SDN solution can be mitigated using a hierarchy of 
controllers and/or through the usage of redundant controllers at least for the most important system 
functions to be controlled.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched very recently a framework with a 
set of voluntary guidelines to help organizations make their communications and computing operations 
safer (NIST, 2014). This could be achieved through a systematic verification of the system infrastructure 
in terms of risk assessment, protection against threats, and capabilities to respond and recover from 
attacks. Following the last verification principles, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is creating a program called Mining and Understanding Software Enclaves (MUSE) to enhance 
the quality of the US military’s software. This program is designed to produce more robust software that 
can work with big datasets without causing errors or crashing under the sheer volume of information 
(DARPA, 2014). In addition, security and privacy are becoming very urgent Big Data aspects that need to 
be tackled (Agrawal, Das, & El Abbadi, 2011). To illustrate this, the social networks have enabled people 
to share and distribute valuable copyrighted digital contents in a very easy way. Consequently, the 
copyright infringement behaviors, such as illicit copying, malicious distribution, unauthorized access and 
usage, and free sharing of copyright-protected digital contents, will become a much more common 
phenomenon. To mitigate these problems, Big Data should have solid solutions to support author’s 
privacy and author’s copyrights (Marques & Serrão, 2013a). Also, users share more and more personal 
data and user generated content through their mobile devices and computers to social networks and cloud 
services, loosing data and content control with a serious impact on their own privacy. Finally, one 
potentially promising approach is to create additional uncertainty for attackers by dynamically changing 
system properties in what is called a cyber moving target (MT) (Okhravi, Hobson, Bigelow, & Streilein, 
2014). They present a summary of several types of MT techniques, consider the advantages and 
weaknesses of each, and make recommendations for future research in this area. 
The current chapter endorses the most important aspects of Big Data security and privacy and is 
structured as follows. The first section discusses the most important challenges to the aspects of 
information security and privacy imposed by the novel requirements of Big Data applications. The second 
section presents and explains some interesting solutions to the problems found in the previous section. 
The third and fourth sections are related with two case studies in this exciting emergent area.  
BIG DATA CHALLENGES TO INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
With the proliferation of devices connected to the Internet and connected to each other, the volume of 
data collected, stored, and processed is increasing everyday, which also brings new challenges in terms of 
the information security. In fact, the currently used security mechanisms such as firewalls and DMZs 
cannot be used in the Big Data infrastructure because the security mechanisms should be stretched out of 
the perimeter of the organization's network to fulfill the user/data mobility requirements and the policies 
of BYOD (Bring Your Own Device). Considering these new scenarios, the pertinent question is what 
security and privacy policies and technologies are more adequate to fulfill the current top Big Data 
privacy and security demands (Cloud Security Alliance, 2013). These challenges may be organized into 
four Big Data aspects such as infrastructure security (e.g. secure distributed computations using 
MapReduce), data privacy (e.g. data mining that preserves privacy/granular access), data management 
(e.g. secure data provenance and storage) and, integrity and reactive security (e.g. real time monitoring of 
anomalies and attacks). 
Considering Big Data there is a set of risk areas that need to be considered. These include the information 
lifecycle (provenance, ownership and classification of data), the data creation and collection process, and 
the lack of security procedures. Ultimately, the Big Data security objectives are no different from any 
other data types – to preserve its confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Being Big Data such an important and complex topic, it is almost natural that immense security and 
privacy challenges will arise (Michael & Miller, 2013; Tankard, 2012). Big Data has specific 
characteristics that affect information security: variety, volume, velocity, value, variability, and veracity 
(Figure 1). These challenges have a direct impact on the design of security solutions that are required to 
tackle all these characteristics and requirements (Demchenko, Ngo, Laat, Membrey, & Gordijenko, 2014). 
Currently, such out of the box security solution does not exist.  
 
Figure 1. The five V’s of Big Data (adapted from (“IBM big data platform - Bringing big data to the 
Enterprise,” 2014)) 
Cloud Secure Alliance (CSA), a non-profit organization with a mission to promote the use of best 
practices for providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, has created a Big Data Working 
Group that has focused on the major challenges to implement secure Big Data services (Cloud Security 
Alliance, 2013). CSA has categorized the different security and privacy challenges into four different 
aspects of the Big Data ecosystem. These aspects are Infrastructure Security, Data Privacy, Data 
Management and, Integrity and Reactive Security. Each of these aspects faces the following security 
challenges, according to CSA: 
 Infrastructure Security 
1. Secure Distributed Processing of Data  
2. Security Best Actions for Non-Relational Data-Bases 
 Data Privacy 
3. Data Analysis through Data Mining Preserving Data Privacy 
4. Cryptographic Solutions for Data Security 
5. Granular Access Control 
 Data Management and Integrity 
6. Secure Data Storage and Transaction Logs 
7. Granular Audits 
8. Data Provenance 
 Reactive Security 
9. End-to-End Filtering & Validation 
10. Supervising the Security Level in Real-Time  
These security and privacy challenges cover the entire spectrum of the Big Data lifecycle (Figure 2): 
sources of data production (devices), the data itself, data processing, data storage, data transport and data 
usage on different devices. 
 
Figure 2. Security and Privacy challenges in Big Data ecosystem (adapted from (Cloud Security Alliance, 
2013)) 
A particular aspect of Big Data security and privacy has to be related with the rise of the Internet of 
Things (IoT). IoT, defined by Oxford
1
 as “a proposed development of the Internet in which everyday 
objects have network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data”, is already a reality – Gartner 
estimates that 26 billion of IoT devices will be installed by 2020, generating an incremental revenue of 
$300 billion (Rivera & van der Meulen, 2014). The immense increase in the number of connected devices 
(cars, lighting systems, refrigerators, telephones, glasses, traffic control systems, health monitoring 
devices, SCADA systems, TVs, home security systems, home automation systems, and many more) has 
led to manufacturers to push to the market, in a short period of time, a large set of devices, cloud systems 
and mobile applications to exploit this opportunity. While it presents tremendous benefits and 
opportunities for end-users it also is responsible for security challenges.  
HP recently conducted a study on market-available IoT solutions and concluded that 70% of those contain 
security problems. These security problems were related with privacy issues, insufficient authorization, 
lack of transport encryption, insecure web interface and inadequate software protection (HP, 2014). Based 
on some of these findings, HP has started a project at OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) 
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that is entitled “OWASP Internet of Things Top Ten” (OWASP, 2014) whose objective is to help IoT 
suppliers to identify the top ten security IoT device problems and how to avoid them. This project, similar 
to the OWASP Top 10, identified the following security problems:  
 Insecure Web Interface: which can allow an attacker to exploit an administration web interface 
(through cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery and SQL injection) and obtain 
unauthorized access to control the IoT device. 
 Insufficient Authentication/Authorization: can allow an attacker to exploit a bad password policy, 
break weak passwords and access to privileged modes on the IoT device. 
 Insecure Network Services: which can lead to an attacker exploiting unnecessary or weak 
services running on the device, or use those services as a jumping point to attack other devices on 
the IoT network. 
 Lack of Transport Encryption: allowing an attacker to eavesdrop data in transit between IoT 
devices and support systems. 
 Privacy Concerns: raised from the fact the most IoT devices and support systems collect personal 
data from users and fail to protect that data. 
 Insecure Cloud Interface: without proper security controls an attacker can use multiple attack 
vectors (insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption, account enumeration) to access 
data or controls via the cloud website. 
 Insecure Mobile Interface: without proper security controls an attacker can use multiple attack 
vectors (insufficient authentication, lack of transport encryption, account enumeration) to access 
data or controls via the mobile interface. 
 Insufficient Security Configurability: due to the lack or poor configuration mechanisms an 
attacker can access data or controls on the device. 
 Insecure Software/Firmware: attackers can take advantage of unencrypted and unauthenticated 
connections to hijack IoT devices updates, and perform malicious update that can compromise the 
device, a network of devices and the data they hold. 
 Poor Physical Security: if the IoT device is physically accessible than an attacker can use USB 
ports, SD cards or other storage means to access the device OS and potentially any data stored on 
the device. 
It is clear that Big Data present interesting opportunities for users and businesses, however these 
opportunities are countered by enormous challenges in terms of privacy and security (Cloud Security 
Alliance, 2013). Traditional security mechanisms are insufficient to provide a capable answer to those 
challenges. In the next section, some of these solutions/proposals are going to be addressed.  
SOLUTIONS/PROPOSALS TO ADDRESS BIG DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
CHALLENGES 
There is no single magical solution to solve the identified Big Data security and privacy challenges and 
traditional security solutions, which are mainly dedicated to protect small amounts of static data, are not 
adequated to the novel requisites imposed by Big Data services (Cloud Security Alliance, 2013). There is 
the need to understand how the collection of large amounts of complex structured and unstructured data 
can be protected. Non-authorized access to that data to create new relations, combine different data 
sources and make it available to malicious users is a serious risk for Big Data. The basic and more 
common solution for this includes encrypting everything to make data secure regardless where the data 
resides (data center, computer, mobile device, or any other). As Big Data grows and its processing gets 
faster, then encryption, masking and tokenization are critical elements for protecting sensitive data. 
Due to its characteristics, Big Data projects need to take an holistic vision at security (Tankard, 2012). 
Big Data projects need to take into consideration the identification of the different data sources, the origin 
and creators of data, as well as who is allowed to access the data. It is also necessary to conduct a correct 
classification to identify critical data, and align with the organization information security policy in terms 
of enforcing access control and data handling policies. As a recommendation, different security 
mechanisms should be closer to the data sources and data itself, in order to provide security right at the 
origin of data, and mechanisms of control and prevention on archiving, data leakage prevention and 
access control should work together (Kindervag, Balaouras, Hill, & Mak, 2012). 
The new Big Data security solutions should extend the secure perimeter from the enterprise to the public 
cloud (Juels & Oprea, 2013). In this way, a trustful data provenance mechanism should be also created 
across domains. In addition, similar mechanisms to the ones used in (Luo, Lin, Zhang, & Zukerman, 
2013) can be used to mitigate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks launched against Big Data 
infrastructures. Also, a Big Data security and privacy is necessary to ensure data trustworthiness 
throughout the entire data lifecycle – from data collection to usage. 
The personalization feature of some Big Data services and its impact on the user privacy is discussed in 
(Hasan, Habegger, Brunie, Bennani, & Damiani, 2013). They discuss these issues in the backdrop of 
EEXCESS, a concrete project aimed to both provide high level recommendations and to respect user 
privacy. A recent work describes proposed privacy extensions to UML to help software engineers to 
quickly visualize privacy requirements, and design them into Big Data applications (Jutla, Bodorik, & 
Ali, 2013). 
While trying to take the most of Big Data, in terms of security and privacy, it becomes mandatory that 
mechanisms that address legal requirements about data handling, need to be met. Secure encryption 
technology must be employed to protect all the confidential data (Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII), Protected Health Information (PHI) and Intellectual Property (IP) and careful cryptographic 
material (keys) access management policies, need to be put in place, to ensure the correct locking and 
unlocking of data – this is particularly important for data stored. In order to be successful these 
mechanisms need to be transparent to the end-user and have low impact of the performance and 
scalability of data (software and hardware-based encryptions mechanisms are to be considered) 
(Advantech, 2013). 
As previously referred, traditional encryption and anonymization of data are not adequate to solve Big 
Data problems. They are adequate to protect static information, but are not adequate when data 
computation is involved (MIT, 2014). Therefore, other techniques, allowing specific and targeted data 
computation while keeping the data secret, need to be used. Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) (Lindell & 
Pinkas, 2002), Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) (Gentry, 2009) and Functional Encryption (FE) 
(Goldwasser et al., 2014), and partition of data on non-communicating data centers, can help solving the 
limitations of traditional security techniques.  
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which allows specific types of computations (e.g. RSA 
public key encryption algorithm) to be carried out on ciphertext and generate an encrypted result which, 
when decrypted, matches the result of operations performed on the plaintext (Gentry, 2010). Fully 
homomorphic encryption has numerous applications, as referred in (Van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, & 
Vaikuntanathan, 2010). This allows encrypted queries on databases, which keeps secret private user 
information where that data is normally stored (somewhere in the cloud – in the limit an user can store its 
data on any untrusted server, but in encrypted form, without being worried with the data secrecy) (Ra 
Popa & Redfield, 2011). It also enables private queries to a search engine - the user submits an encrypted 
query and the search engine computes a succinct encrypted answer without ever looking at the query in 
the clear which could contain private user information such as the number of the national healthcare 
service. The homomorphic encryption also enables searching on encrypted data - a user stores encrypted 
files on a remote file server and can later have the server retrieve only files that (when decrypted) satisfy 
some boolean constraint, even though the server cannot decrypt the files on its own. More broadly, the 
fully homomorphic encryption improves the efficiency of secure multiparty computation. 
An important security and privacy challenge for Big Data is related with the storage and processing of 
encrypted data. Running queries against an encrypted database is a basic security requirement for secure 
Big Data however it is a challenging one. This raises questions such as a) is the database encrypted with a 
single or multiple keys; b) does the database needs to be decrypted prior to running the query; c) do the 
queries need to be also encrypted; d) who as the permissions to decrypt the database; and many more. 
Recently a system that was developed at MIT, provides answers to some of these questions. CryptDB 
allows researchers to run database queries over encrypted data (Ra Popa & Redfield, 2011). Trustworthy 
applications that intent to query encrypted data will pass those queries to a CryptDB proxy (that sits 
between the application and the database) that rewrites those queries in a specific way so that they can be 
run against the encrypted database. The database returns the encrypted results back to the proxy, which 
holds a master key and will decrypt the results, sending the final answer back to the application. CryptDB 
supports numerous forms of encryption schemes that allow different types of operations on the data (RA 
Popa & Redfield, 2012). Based on CryptDB, Google has developed the Encrypted Big Query Client that 
will allow encrypted big queries against their BigQuery service that enables super, SQL-like queries 
against append-only tables, using the processing power of Google's infrastructure (Google, 2014). 
Apart from more specific security recommendations, it is also important to consider the security of the IT 
infrastructure itself. One of the common security practices is to place security controls at the edge of the 
networks however, if an attacker violates this security perimeter it will have access to all the data within 
it. Therefore, a new approach is necessary to move those security controls near to the data (or add 
additional ones). Monitoring, analyzing and learning from data usage and access is also an important 
aspect to continuously improve security of the data holding infrastructure and leverage the already 
existing security solutions (Kindervag et al., 2012; Kindervag, Wang, Balaouras, & Coit, 2011). 
A CASE STUDY IN A SECURE SOCIAL APPLICATION 
Social networks are one of the key-applications for a large number of users. Millions and millions of 
persons are connected to some kind of social network – e.g. Facebook according to its own accounting 
has more than 829 million daily active users on average (654 million with mobile access). Social 
networks are quite attractive to users because they allow communication with new persons and concede 
users the ability to expose their own network of friends to others, creating new relations and pairings 
among users and between users and content (McKenzie et al., 2012). Users take advantage of this 
functionality to share all kinds of digital content within the social network, with other users (either they 
are their direct contacts or they are in other one's connections). These social network-sharing 
functionalities are extremely powerful and engaging of further social interaction. However, they are at the 
same time, the cause of serious privacy and security problems because sharing control is not on the end-
user side. This represents a serious threat to the user privacy since content shared in these platforms can 
easily be exposed to a wider audience in just a few seconds. It is difficult, for an ordinary user, to select 
specific sharing properties for the content placed in social network and ensure that it stays under its 
control.  
With the emergence of Web 2.0, users have changed from being simply information consumers to 
become important content producers. User generated content is content that is voluntarily developed by 
an individual or a consortium, and distributed through an online platform. The volume of user generated 
content currently produced and made available through several platforms is already immense and 
continues to grow in size (Kim, Jin, Kim, & Shin, 2012). For instance, Facebook stores, accesses, and 
analyzes more than 30 Petabytes of user generated data (100 terabytes of data are uploaded daily to 
Facebook) and YouTube users upload 48 hours of new video every minute of the day (McKenzie et al., 
2012). 
Currently, social network platforms already present a set of pre-defined but limited content privacy and 
security sharing controls (X. Chen & Shi, 2009). Major social network platforms offer the possibility for 
users to share content under specific privacy rules, which are defined by the social platform and not by 
the end-user. Most of the times, these rules are extremely permissive and differ from platform to platform. 
Also, on social networks, content is shared in a non-protected manner, making it easier for unauthorized 
usage and sharing. Users are also bound by subsequent privacy policies changes that threaten more and 
more the user right to protect its personal information and personal content. 
The other problem that is most of the times associated with the security and privacy of content shared on 
social networks, is related to the security of the social network platform itself (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). 
The exploitation of the social network infrastructure can lead to security and privacy threats. On the other 
hand, recently on the media there have been some allegations about the cooperation of some of the most 
important IT suppliers (including some major social platforms) with governmental agencies to allow the 
unauthorized access to user’s information and content. This latter fact is quite relevant, because, in theory, 
the social network service supplier has unlimited access to the information and content of all its 
customers.  
This is an increasing serious problem, not only for end-users but also for organizations. More and more, 
organizations rely on social network services as a mean to disseminate information, create relations with 
and between employees and customers, knowledge capture and dissemination. The privacy and security 
challenges presented by these new ways of communication and interaction are very pertinent topics for 
both end users and organizations. 
The continuous growing proliferation of mobile devices (mostly smartphones and tablets, but soon more 
devices will enter this scenario) with capabilities of producing content (mainly audio recordings, videos 
and pictures) at the palm of every user’s hand, following them everywhere and anytime is also a serious 
threat to their content privacy and security (De Cristofaro, Soriente, Tsudik, & Williams, 2012). This user 
generated content creates cultural, symbolic, and affective benefit including personal satisfaction, 
enhanced skill or reputation, improved functionality for existing games or devices, community building or 
civic engagement. In more simplistic terms, user generated content creates value, economic or not. 
Having all of this into consideration, it seems clear that it is necessary to have a clear separation among 
the social network platform providers, their social functionalities, and the user generated content that they 
hold. It is important to create mechanisms that transfer part of the security and sharing control to the end-
user side. Having this into consideration, in this section, it is proposed and presented a paradigm shift that 
implies a change from the current social networks security and privacy scenario based on a social network 
platform centric, to another paradigm that empowers social networks users’ on the control and safeguard 
of its privacy, passing the user generated content sharing control to the end-user side, using rights 
management systems (Marques & Serrão, 2013b). Also, the entity that is responsible for the storage and 
protection of the user generated content is independent of the social network platform itself. 
This new approach creates a mechanism that protects the shared user generated content on the social 
network platform while it provides the content sharing and access control to the end-user. 
Overall system architecture 
As referred on the previous section, the novel approach that is followed is based on open rights 
management systems – in particular, and for this sake, it is based on OpenSDRM (Carlos Serrão, Neves, 
Trevor Barker, & Massimo Balestri, 2003; Serrão, 2008). OpenSDRM is an open and distributed rights 
management architecture that allows the implementation of different content business models. Moreover, 
OpenSDRM was created having into consideration interoperability aspects (Serrão, Rodriguez, & 
Delgado, 2011) that permit that the different modules that compose the system to be decoupled and re-
integrated to allow interoperability (Serrão, Dias, & Kudumakis, 2005; Serrão et al., 2011) with other 
non-OpenSDRM components, using an open and well-defined API (Figure 3). Additionally there may 
exist also more than one instance of each of the services on the platform, allowing the scalability and 
growth of the set of all possible configuration options (Serrão, Dias, & Delgado, 2005). 
 Figure 3 - Overview of the architecture integrated with the rights management system 
For the proposed scenario, the social network platform can be integrated with the rights management 
system, using different methods. If the social network implements a development API or if it is open-
source, a much tighter integration scenario can be achieved. If not, it is possible to use other publicly 
available mechanisms on the platform (or out of the platform) to enable a lesser integrated scenario, but 
that maintains the privacy and security characteristics sought. Using mechanisms on the platform is the 
most common scenario and therefore is the approach that will be reflected here. 
In this architecture there are some elements that cooperate in order to provide the necessary 
functionalities to both the end-users and the social network platform, in order to implement the necessary 
mechanisms to provide security and privacy to user generated content. 
OpenSDRM, as an open rights management framework is composed by different services (Figure 4). 
Some of the services are deployed on the server-side while other are implemented on the user-side. On the 
user-side, the authorization service handles the requests to render some type of content on the user device, 
processing the requests and matching them to existing credentials, licenses and permissions to render the 
content. Also, on the end-user side the content rendering service is responsible for verifying the necessary 
requirements to render the content (encryption, scrambling, and others) and effectively renders the 
content for the end user. 
On the server-side, is where a large part of the rights management responsibility lies. A set of decoupled 
components with a well-defined API that allows an integration between the necessary ones to implement 
the specific content business model. These services are the following: 
 Content storage and distribution service: this service is responsible for the storage and 
distribution of user generated content in a protected manner; 
 Content protection service: the service is responsible for the protection of the content. The 
content is protected by specific protection tools and specific protection mechanisms that may 
change according to the content and the business model that is going to be implemented; 
 Content registration service: this service is responsible for registering the content on the platform 
that will be used to uniquely identify the content on the system. This unique identifier is used to 
identify the user generated content throughout the entire content lifecycle; 
 Payment service: if the business model includes the possibility to trade content, this payment 
service is responsible to communicate with a payment gateway that implements the necessary 
mechanisms to process payments; 
 Protection tools service: this service is responsible for the registration of content protection tools 
on the system and for making those tools available for the content protection service to use when 
implementing the content protection schemas (such as encryption, scrambling, watermarking and 
others); 
 Authentication service: handles the registration of users and services on the system as well as the 
requests for authenticate users on behalf of other services; 
 Licensing service: this is one of the most important services of the rights management 
framework, responsible for creating license templates, define and produce new content licenses 
(that represent the type of rights, permissions and/or restrictions of a given user, or group of 
users, over the content) and provide licenses, upon request, to specific users. 
 
Figure 4. Overview of the architecture integrated with the rights management system 
The following sections of this document will provide a description on how the user can utilize this 
platform to share user generated content on the social network, and how a user can access content shared 
by other users. 
Registration on the platform 
This novel platform presupposes that all the system services are initially registered on that platform. This 
means that each one of the different services, either server-side or client-side have to be individually 
registered at the platform. This registration process assigns unique credentials to each one of the services, 
ensuring that they are uniquely registered and that these credentials will be used to identify and 
differentiate the services in future interactions (Figure 5). This registration process is conducted by the 
authentication service that on its turn issues credentials to all the other services and acts as a central 
trustworthy mechanism. Moreover, all the communication between the different services is conducted 
over a secure and authenticated channel, using Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security(SSL/TLS) 
– this ensures the authentication and security of the servers where the services are deployed and allowing 
the establishment of secure communication channels (Stephen A Thomas, 2000). 
 Figure 5 - Handling the registration of new services on the platform 
1. The authentication service (AS) has cryptographic material (Kpub
AS
, Kpriv
AS
) and credentials that 
were self-issued (C
AS
AS) or issued by other trustworthy entity (C
CA
AS); 
2. The service that needs to be registered generates a key pair (Kpub
S
, Kpriv
S
) and sends a registration 
request to the AS, passing some information about the service (Sinfo) and the public key (Kpub
S
) of 
the service: Sinfo + Kpub
S
; 
3. AS receives this information, verifies it and then creates a unique service identifier (SUUID). After 
this verification the AS creates the service credentials that will identify this service globally and 
uniquely on the platform: C
AS
S[UUID] = Kpriv
AS
{SUUID, Kpub
S[UUID]
, C
AS
AS}
2
. These credentials, which 
are signed by AS, are then returned to the requesting service; 
4. The requesting service, stores the credentials. This credential contains also the public key of the 
authentication service (Kpub
AS
). This is used to prove this credentials to other entities that also rely 
on the same AS – services that trust AS, also trust on credentials issued by AS, presented by other 
services. 
The service registration process, as described above needs to be repeated according to the number of 
services available within the social network platform. This enables the entire ecosystem of services to be 
trusted on that platform. 
Another important aspect of the registration process concerns the registration of the users on the rights 
management platform. The registration of the user on the rights management platform can be dependent 
or independent of the social network platform. In the example that is presented here, it is assumed that 
this registration process is performed fully integrated with the social network platform. 
This process performs in the following manner (Figure 6): 
1. Assuming that the user still has no account on a social network platform, the user starts the 
registration process on the social network. In order to do that the user needs to supply its email 
address (as username) and a password; 
2. The registration process on the social network platform finishes and a confirmation message is 
sent to the end-user; 
3. Next, the user, using the client-side rights management authorization service (AUTS), initiates 
the registration process in the rights management platform. The AUTS presents several 
registration options to the end-user (integrated with some social network platforms -using either 
                                                     
2
 Some notes about the notation used: key(content) means the “content” is encrypted using “key”; key{content} 
represents “content” is signed using “key”; algo[content] means that “content” is hashed with the “algo” algorithm. 
Oauth- or an independent mode). For this case, the user will use registration options by using the 
mode of integrated authentication; 
4. The user introduces the social account credentials (email, password) on the AUTS that starts the 
authentication process on the social network platform. If successful, the social network returns an 
access token that has a specific validity and a set of permissions to conduct different operations 
on the social network on behalf of the user; 
5. AUTS, using the user credentials (email, password) creates a secret key that is used to initialize a 
secure storage on the authorization service: Sk
SStorage
 = SHA1[email+password]; 
 
Figure 6 - Overview of the user registration process 
6. The AUTS securely stores the user information, and the social network access token. 
Additionally, the AUTS creates a key-pair for the user (Kpub
U
, Kpriv
U
) also storing it in a secure 
manner: Sk
SStorage
(Kpub
U
, Kpriv
U
, user_info, token); 
7. AUTS contacts the AS to register the user on the platform. This is performed using the CASS[AUTS] 
that contains the Kpub
AS
. C
AS
S[AUTS] is also sent to ensure that the AUTS has been previously 
registered: Kpub
AS
 (email, Kpub
U
,C
AS
S[AUTS]); 
8. The AUTS receives all this information and after deciphering it, and validating the AUTS 
credential, registers the user information, generates a unique identifier for the user and creates 
credentials for the user: C
AS
UUID = Kpriv
AS
 {UUID, Kpub
U
}; 
9. The credentials are returned to the AUTS and are securely stored: Sk
SStorage
(C
AS
UUID). The user is 
notified about the result of the registration operation. 
This is the concluding step of the service and user registration on the rights management platform. The 
user is now prepared to use both the rights management service and the social network platform. 
Sharing content on the platform 
The other important functionality on the system is the sharing of user generated content (UGC) on the 
social network. This sharing mechanism is performed through the rights management platform, and the 
content is stored securely on a configured location (it can be on a specific storage location, on the social 
platform or on the rights management platform). When the user uploads user generated content, the 
content is protected and the rights, permissions and restrictions about the content can be defined by the 
user. 
 
Figure 7 - Overview of the user generated content secure sharing on the social network platform 
This process assumes that both user that generates the content and the users willing to access the content 
are properly registered and authenticated on the social network platform and on the rights management 
platform (Figure 7). 
In a brief discussing way, the user generated content is uploaded to the rights management platform, the 
access rights and permissions are defined by the user, the content is protected, and a URI is returned to be 
shared on the social network platform. 
The novel content sharing process, using the mechanisms described in this chapter, can be now defined in 
the following steps: 
1. The user sends the user generated content (UGC) that it expects to share on the social network. 
This UGC is uploaded through the content rendering service (CRS). This service requires the user 
to enter its credentials (email and password), if the user is not yet authenticated. These credentials 
are used to access the secure storage: Sk
SStorage
 = SHA1[email+password]; 
2. The CRS contacts the AUTS, which reads from the secure storage the user rights management 
system credentials: C
AS
UUID; 
3. The CRS uploads to the content protection service (CPS) the UGC and sends the user credentials, 
obtained in the previous step: UGCUUID, C
AS
UUID; 
4. The CPS, after retrieving some metadata information about the UGC (such as the type, the 
format, the encoding, among others), contacts the protection tools service (PTS), requesting a list 
of available protection tools, that can be suitable to protect the UGC. The PTS sends its 
credentials and some information about the content: C
AS
CPS, UGC_info;  
5. The PTS also returns a list of protection tools that match the request made by the CPS. This 
information is signed by PTS: Kpriv
PTS
{protection_tools_list}; 
6. The CPS returns the list of protection tools to the CRS, and presents it to the user. The user 
selects the most appropriate protection tools, adjusting the parameters of applicability of the tools 
to the UGC and submits its request about the necessary protection tools; 
7. The CPS requests the selected protection tools from the protection tools service. The PTS returns 
the requested tools to the CPS; 
8. Next, the CPS requests to the content registration service for the UGC to be registered. For this, 
the CPS send its credentials, the UCG metadata and the content hash: C
AS
CPS, UGC_info, 
SHA1[UGC]; 
9. The content registration service (CRGS), stores the received information, and generates a unique 
content identifier that is returned to the content protection service: Kpriv
CRS.
{UGCUUID}; 
10. The CPS generates one or more content encryption keys (CEK[1], CEK[2] … CEK[n]) that are 
applied over the UGC, using the selected protection tools, in order to ensure the appropriate 
content protection; 
11. Following this protection process, the CPS sends the content encryption keys for registration at 
the licensing service. Each of the content encryption keys is protected with the user key, and the 
entire message is protected by the CPS key: C
AS
CPS, Kpub
CPS
(Kpub
U(CEK[1], CEK[2] … CEK[n]), 
UGCUUID); 
12. The licensing service (LS) after validating all the received information, returns a list of licensing 
templates to the content protection service. The CPS returns the list of licensing templates to 
CRS, and the user can select the most appropriate license template, modify it and adapt it, or 
simply create a new one; 
13. The license template (LICTPL) is sent to the CPS that after sends it to the licensing service and 
associates it with the identifier of the UGC: LICTPL, UGCUUID. The licensing service returns the 
license template identifier (LICTPL [UUID]); 
14. In the next stage, the CPS sends the protected UGC to the content storage and distribution service 
that stores the encrypted content: C
AS
CPS, Kpriv
CPS
{CEK[n](UGC), UGCUUID }; 
15. The content storage and distribution service returns a URI for the location of the stored encrypted 
UGC. This URI is returned to the user that can share it on the social network platform afterwards. 
After this process is completed, the UGC shared by the user is shared on the social network platform. The 
user can also use the social network sharing mechanisms as a way to control how the UGC is propagated 
on the social network. But, in order to have a fine grained control over the UGC, the user needs to use the 
rights management system to produce specific licenses with the conditions under which the UGC can be 
used. These licenses are produced in multiple formats (either in ODRL or MPEG-21 REL). In addition, 
these licenses are used to support the expression of rights over the UGC. Therefore, when the user 
uploads user generated content to the rights management system, and after the process that was described 
previously, the subsequent steps are the following: 
1. The CPS contacts licensing service to obtain the appropriate license template for the specific 
UGC, which was previously created: LICTPL [UUID]. The license template is an XML-formatted 
document that contains parameterized fields that can be adapted to specific rights situations; 
2. A typical license template for user generated content would be composed by following elements: 
a. User unique identifier (UUID), multiple users (UUID1, UUID2,…, UUIDn) or a group 
identifier (GUUID): these fields represent the unique identifiers of the users or groups to 
whom the user generated content is going to be shared; 
b. The unique identifier of the content: UGCUUID; 
c. List of permissions (Permission1…Permissionn); 
d. List of restrictions (Restriction1…Restrictionn); 
e. Validity date (validity); 
f. The different content encryption keys (CEK[1], CEK[2] … CEK[n]). The content 
encryption keys are protected with user public key: Kpub
U(CEK[1], CEK[2] … CEK[n]); 
g. The license signature, where the license contents are signed by the licensing service: 
License = Kpriv
LIS
 {UUID1.. UUIDn , GUUID1 , GUUIDn , UGCUUID, Permission1 
..Permissionn , Restriction1 ..Restrictionn, Validity, Kpub
U
 (CEK[1] … CEK[n])}. 
3. The license is stored on the licensing service, where it can be accessed by legitimate users. 
Accessing content on the platform 
Finally the last process in this case-study is to present how the users can access user generated content 
that was shared by other users on the social network platform. In order to do that, the user needs to be 
registered on the social network platform and on the rights management system. 
When navigating through the timeline of the social network platform, user generated content that was 
shared over the social network platform, is presented in the form of a special URI, that, when clicked, is 
intercepted by the rights management platform, and the access process is started. 
The referred process is described in the following steps: 
1. The CRS, while trying to render the content that is shared on the social network platform, detects 
that it is protected content, and contacts the authorization service to access the appropriate 
information to try rendering the content; 
2. The user authenticates to the system using the authorization service, supplying its credentials 
(email and password) to unlock the secure storage and retrieve the user information; 
3. The authorization service, using the UGCUUID embedded on the URI, checks if a license for this 
UGC already exists on the secure storage. If a license already exists: 
a. The authorization service checks the license contents, validating the license digital 
signature and verifying the UGCUUID; 
b. If the UGCUUID is the right one, the Validity is checked and the list of permissions and 
restrictions are evaluated; 
c. If the conditions are met, the content can be deciphered and rendered by the content 
rendering service. The content encryption keys can be retrieved from the license, and 
used to decipher the content: Kpriv
U
(Kpub
U(CEK[1] … CEK[n]))= CEK[1] … CEK[n]; 
d. Content is rendered by the CRS while the license conditions are fulfilled; 
4. If the authorization still does not possess a valid license for the UGCUUID that the content 
rendering service is trying to render to view, the following process should occur: 
a. The user authenticates to the system using the authorization service, supplying its 
credentials (email and password) to unlock the secure storage and retrieve the user 
information; 
b. The authorization service, after getting the appropriated user information, including the 
credentials, from the secure storage, allows the CRS to contact the licensing service, 
passing its credentials (C
AS
CRS), the user credentials (C
AS
UUID) and the user generated 
content identifier (UGCUUID) the user is trying to render; 
c. The licensing service receives and validates the data that was sent by the CRS, and uses 
the user generated content unique identifier (UGCUUID) and the user unique identifier 
(UUID) to verify the existence of a valid license. If the license exists on the system, that 
license is returned to the CRS, that passes it, for validation and storage, to the 
authorization service: License = Kpriv
LIS
 {UUID1.. UUIDn , GUUID1 , GUUIDn , UGCUUID, 
Permission1 ..Permissionn , Restriction1 ..Restrictionn, Validity, Kpub
U
 (CEK[1] … 
CEK[n])}; 
d. The authorization service validates the license signature, verifying its contents and 
validity and asserting the correct UGCUUID; 
e. If the UGCUUID is the right one, the Validity is checked and the list of permissions and 
restrictions are evaluated; 
f. If the conditions are met, the content can be deciphered and rendered by the CRS. The 
content encryption keys can be retrieved from the license, and used to decipher the 
content: Kpriv
U
(Kpub
U(CEK[1] … CEK[n]))= CEK[1] … CEK[n]; 
g. Content is rendered by the CRS while the license conditions are satisfied. 
After this process is executed, the access to the CRS can be granted or not, depending on the conditions 
expressed on the license. For simplicity sake, there are several other processes that were not included in 
this description, such as, for instance, the verification of the protection mechanisms that were applied to 
the content, and the download of the appropriated mechanisms to allow the local temporarily unprotected 
version of the user generated content to be rendered. 
The usage of rights management systems to offer security and privacy to shared user generated content, 
offers additional privacy and security mechanisms that are out of the control of the social network 
platform itself (Rodríguez, Rodríguez, Carreras, & Delgado, 2009). The users can take advantage of both 
(the rights management system and the social network platform) to offer a finer control on the content 
sharing privacy and security properties. This is a novel approach (Marques & Serrão, 2013b) that clearly 
puts the security and privacy control on the end-user side. 
A CASE STUDY FOR AN INTELLIGENT INTRUSION DETECTION/PREVENTION 
SYSTEM ON A SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORK 
This section presents and discusses a case study about an intelligent Intrusion Detection/Prevention 
System (IDS/IPS) belonging to a software-defined network. In this case study, the IDS/IPS behavior is 
controlled by a Kinetic module (Feamster, 2014). The Kinetic language (Monsanto, Reich, Foster, 
Rexford, & Walker, 2013) is an SDN control framework where operators can define a network policy as a 
Finite State Machine (FSM). The transitions between states of a FSM can be triggered by different types 
of dynamic events in the network, (e.g. intrusion detection, host state). Based on different network events, 
operators can enforce different policies to the network using an intuitive FSM model. Kinetic is 
implemented as a Pyretic controller module written in Python. In order to acquire more details related to 
Pyretic and Python, consult respectively (Pyretic, 2014) and (Python, 2014). 
“A Kinetic control program permits programmer-defined events to dynamically change forwarding 
behavior for an arbitrary set of flows. Such events can range from topology changes (generated by the 
Pyretic runtime) to security incidents (generated by an intrusion detection system). The programmer 
specifies an FSM description that contains set of states, each of which maps to some network behavior 
that are encoded using Pyretic’s policy language; and a set of transitions between those states, each of 
which may be triggered by events that the operator defines” (Feamster, 2014). In order to obtain further 
information on Kinetic, consult (Monsanto et al., 2013). 
In this case study, an implementation of an IDS/IPS security module will be developed, which should 
behave as follows: 
 If a host is infected and is not a privileged host then it is dropped; 
 If a host is infected and is a privileged (exempt) host then the traffic from that host is 
automatically redirected to a garden wall host, where some corrective security actions could be 
issued over that infected host (e.g. clean and install security patches for trying to recover it); 
 If a host is not infected then the traffic from that host is forwarded towards its final destination. 
Code Explanation 
In Table 1, it is displayed a partial view of the Python code that implements the Kinetic control program 
that will be used in this section to evaluate the intelligent IDS/IPS. To become clearer, this code 
functionality is explained in the following paragraph. 
Each time a new packet arrives to the system, the IDS/IPS initially processes that packet and defines the 
policy to be applied to that packet (i.e. drop | redirect | forward). This policy is then delivered to a second 
module that implements further MAC functionality, namely the learning algorithm of MAC addresses to 
enhance the L2 packet forwarding. This second module is the one that effectively forwards or redirects 
the packet (otherwise if the packet is to be drooped, this second module will not receive any packet at all 
because it was already discarded by the first IDS/IPS module).  
The code shown in Table 1 corresponds to the IDS/IPS module and has its code encapsulated inside a 
class designated by “gardenwall”, which was instantiated from class “DynamicPolicy” (to support the 
processing of JSON events, as it will be explained below). The function “lpec” is like a packet input filter 
because it only selects the packets whose source IP address is specified by variable srcip. This aims to 
process the first packet of a flow exactly in the same way as all the following packets of that flow. In this 
example, a transition function encodes logic that indicates the new value a state variable should take when 
a particular event arrives at the controller. For example, the infected transition function encodes a single 
case: when an infected event occurs, the new value taken by the state variable infected is the value of that 
event (i.e. FALSE or TRUE). This is an example of an exogenous transition (i.e. the state variable 
infected is changed by an external event); other exogenous transition in this scenario is the one associated 
with the state variable exempt. In opposition, the transition associated to the state variable policy is 
endogenous because its state is triggered by both internal state variables of the current FSM: infected and 
exempt. 
Table 1 - Partial view of the code for the module IDS/IPS. 
class gardenwall(DynamicPolicy): 
    def __init__(self): 
        # Garden Wall 
        def redirectToGardenWall(): 
            client_ips = [IP('10.0.0.1'), IP('10.0.0.2')] 
            rewrite_policy = rewriteDstIPAndMAC(client_ips, '10.0.0.3') 
            return rewrite_policy 
        ### DEFINE THE LPEC FUNCTION 
        def lpec(f): 
            return match(srcip=f['srcip']) 
        ## SET UP TRANSITION FUNCTIONS 
        @transition 
        def exempt(self): 
            self.case(occurred(self.event),self.event) 
        @transition 
        def infected(self): 
            self.case(occurred(self.event),self.event) 
        @transition 
        def policy(self): 
            # If exempt, redirect pkt to gardenwall;rewrite dstip to 10.0.0.3 
            self.case(test_and_true(V('exempt'),V('infected')), 
C(redirectToGardenWall())) 
            # If infected, drop pkt 
            self.case(is_true(V('infected')),C(drop)) 
            # Else, identity -> forward pkt 
            self.default(C(identity)) 
         ### SET UP THE FSM DESCRIPTION 
        self.fsm_def = FSMDef( 
            infected=FSMVar(type=BoolType(), 
                            init=False, 
                            trans=infected), 
            exempt=FSMVar(type=BoolType(), 
                          init=False, 
                          trans=exempt), 
            policy=FSMVar(type=Type(Policy, 
                   {drop,identity,redirectToGardenWall()}), 
                          init=identity, 
                          trans=policy)) 
        ### SET UP POLICY AND EVENT STREAMS 
        fsm_pol = FSMPolicy(lpec,self.fsm_def) 
        json_event = JSONEvent() 
        json_event.register_callback(fsm_pol.event_handler) 
        super(gardenwall,self).__init__(fsm_pol) 
The Finite State Machine (FSM) (see Figure 8) used in the current scenario associates the transition 
functions previously defined with the appropriate state variables. The FSM definition consists of a set of 
state variable definitions. Each variable definition simply specifies the variable’s type (i.e., set of 
allowable values), initial value, and associated transition functions. The infected variable is a boolean 
whose initial value is FALSE (representing the assumption that hosts are initially not infected), and 
transitions based on the infected function defined previously. Likewise, the policy variable can take the 
values drop or identity, initially starts in the identity state, and transitions based on the policy function 
defined previously. The FSMPolicy that Kinetic provides automatically directs each incoming external 
event to the appropriate lpec FSM, where it will be handled by the exogenous transition function specified 
in the FSM description (i.e. the function self.fsm_def). In this way, it is ensured that the FSM works as 
expected. 
Infected: False
Policy: Identity
Infected: True
Policy: Identity
Infected: False
Policy: Drop
Infected: True
Policy: Drop
Exogenous Transition
Endogenous Transition
(Infected, True)
(Infected, False)
 
 
Figure 8– Finite State Machine (FSM) (Feamster, 2014) 
Evaluation 
The network topology used in the current evaluation made with a network emulator is shown in Figure 9. 
All the evaluation was performed in a single Linux virtual machine (Ubuntu). 
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Figure 9 – Network Topology under test (Feamster, 2014) 
We now initiate the evaluation, opening a Linux shell, and run our Kinetic controller application with the 
following commands: 
$ cd ~/pyretic 
$ pyretic.py pyretic.kinetic.examples.gardenwall 
As shown in Figure 10, the kinetic controller prints out some results from a verification of network 
policies using the NuSMV symbolic model checker (NuSMV, 2014). Kinetic automatically generates a 
NuSMV input from the program written by the programmer/operator, and verifies logic statements 
written in CTL (Computation Tree Logic) (CTL, 2014). 
*** Please report bugs to <numsv-users@fbk.eu>
*** Copyright (c) 2010, Fondazione Bruno Kessler
*** This version of NuMSV is linked to the CUDD library version 2.4.1 
*** Copyright (c) 1995-2004, Regents of the University of Colorado 
*** This version  of NuMSV is linked to the MiniSat  SAT solver.
*** See http://www.cs.chalmers.se/Cs/Research/FormalMethods/MiniSat
*** Copyright (c) 2003-2005, Niklas Een, Niklas Sorensson
-- specification AG ((infected & !exempt) -> AX policy = policy_1)   is true
-- specification AG (!infected -> AX policy = policy_2) is true
-- specification AG ((infected & exempt) -> AX policy = policy_3)    is true
-- specification A [ policy = policy_2  U infected ]    is true
system diameter: 3
reachable states: 12 (2^3.58496) out of 12 (2^3.58496)
======================= NuSMV Output  End =====================
POX 0.1.0 (betta)  / Copyright 2011-2013 James McCauley, et al.
Connected to pyretic frontend.
INFO:core:POX 0.1.0 (betta) is up.
 
Figure 10 – Kinetic controller terminal 
In a second shell, we start the network emulator “mininet”, performing the following command: 
$ sudo mn --controller=remote --topo=single,3 --mac –arp 
The obtained output result is visualized in Figure 11. In addition, the bottom line of Figure 12 shows that 
the Kinetic controller discovered the emulated switch. 
mininet@mininet-vm:~$ sudo mn --controller=remote --topo=single, 3 --mac --arp
*** Creating network
*** Adding controller
*** Adding hosts:
h1 h2 h3
*** Adding switches:
s1
*** Adding links:
(h1, s1) (h2, s1) (h3, s1)
*** Configuring hosts
h1 h2 h3
*** Startting controller
*** Startting 1 switches
s1
*** Startting CLI:
mininet>
 
Figure 11 – Mininet terminal 
 
*** Copyright (c) 2010, Fondazione Bruno Kessler
*** This version of NuMSV is linked to the CUDD library version 2.4.1 
*** Copyright (c) 1995-2004, Regents of the University of Colorado 
*** This version  of NuMSV is linked to the MiniSat  SAT solver.
*** See http://www.cs.chalmers.se/Cs/Research/FormalMethods/MiniSat
*** Copyright (c) 2003-2005, Niklas Een, Niklas Sorensson
-- specification AG ((infected & !exempt) -> AX policy = policy_1)   is true
-- specification AG (!infected -> AX policy = policy_2) is true
-- specification AG ((infected & exempt) -> AX policy = policy_3)    is true
-- specification A [ policy = policy_2  U infected ]    is true
system diameter: 3
reachable states: 12 (2^3.58496) out of 12 (2^3.58496)
======================= NuSMV Output  End =====================
POX 0.1.0 (betta)  / Copyright 2011-2013 James McCauley, et al.
Connected to pyretic frontend.
INFO:core:POX 0.1.0 (betta) is up.
INFO: openflow.of_01: [None 1] closed
INFO: openflow.of_01: [00-00-00-00-00-01 2] connected
 
Figure 12 – Switch contacts the controller 
Imagine now the situation that host “h1” become compromised (infected). This situation originates the 
transmission of an event to change the state of the FSM in a way that any traffic originated in that host 
should be discarded in the switch. In this network status, the traffic ICMP between hosts “h1” and “h2” 
becomes blocked. We issue the transmission of the “infected” event to the controller executing in a third 
terminal the following command:   
$ python json_sender.py -n infected -l True --flow="{srcip=10.0.0.1}" -a 
127.0.0.1 -p 50001 
The “infected” event was sent to the controller as it is possible to be visualized in Figure 13. 
mininet@mininet-vm:~/pyretic/pyretic/kinetic$ python json_sender.py -n infected -l 
True --flow ="{srcip=10.0.0.1}" -a 127.0.0.1 -p 50001
Flow_Str = {srcip=10.0.0.1}
Data Payload = {'dstip': None, 'protocol': None, 'srcmac': None, 'tos': None, 
'vlan_pcp': None, 'dstmac': None, 'inport': None, 'switch': None, 'ethtype': None, 
'srcip': '10.0.0.1', 'dstport': None, 'srcport': None, 'vlan_id': None}
Ok
mininet@mininet-vm:~/pyretic/pyretic/kinetic$ 
 
Figure 13 – JSON event transmitted to the controller 
After some milliseconds, the Kinetic controller received the event informing that host h1 is infected (see 
Figure 14). As a consequence of this, the controller changed the policy to drop the packets originated by 
host “h1”. 
-- specification A [ policy = policy_2  U infected ]    is true
system diameter: 3
reachable states: 12 (2^3.58496) out of 12 (2^3.58496)
======================= NuSMV Output  End =====================
POX 0.1.0 (betta)  / Copyright 2011-2013 James McCauley, et al.
Connected to pyretic frontend.
INFO:core:POX 0.1.0 (betta) is up.
INFO: openflow.of_01: [None 1] closed
INFO: openflow.of_01: [00-00-00-00-00-01 2] connected
Received connection from ('127.0.0.1', 42143)
Received event infected is True related with flow {'srcip': 10.0.0.1}
fsm_policy:event_name= infected
fsm_policy:event_value= True
fsm_policy:event_state= {'policy': drop, 'infected': True, 'exempt': False}
fsm_policy:self.policy = if
    match:  ('srcip', 10.0.0.1)
then
    [DynamicPolicy]
    drop
else
    identity
 
Figure 14 – Controller changes the policy to drop 
After this, we have tried to send two ping messages from host “h1” to host “h2” but as it is shown in 
Figure 15 without any success. This occurs because the IDS/IPS installed in the switch between “h1” and 
“h2” a policy to drop the packets originated by host “h1”. 
s1
*** Adding links:
(h1, s1) (h2, s1) (h3, s1)
*** Configuring hosts
h1 h2 h3
*** Startting controller
*** Startting 1 switches
s1
*** Startting CLI:
mininet> h1 ping -c 2 h2
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
--- 10.0.0.2 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 1008ms
mininet>
 
Figure 15 – ICMP traffic is dropped 
Next, assuming that host “h1” was classified as a privileged (exempt) terminal, then the controller will be 
notified from this through the following event: 
$ python json_sender.py -n exempt -l True --flow="{srcip=10.0.0.1}" -a 
127.0.0.1 -p 50001 
Almost immediately, the Kinetic controller received the event informing that host “h1” is infected (see 
Figure 16). As a consequence of this, the controller changed the policy to redirect the packets originated 
by host “h1” to host “h3” (policy modify) for further analysis. This policy is installed in the switch. 
fsm_policy:event_name= infected
fsm_policy:event_value= True
fsm_policy:event_state= {'policy': drop, 'infected': True, 'exempt': False}
fsm_policy:self.policy = if
    match:  ('srcip', 10.0.0.1)
then
    [DynamicPolicy]
    drop
else
    identity
Received connection from ('127.0.0.1', 42144)
Received event exempt is True related with flow {'srcip': 10.0.0.1}
fsm_policy:event_name= exempt
fsm_policy:event_value= True
fsm_policy:event_state= {'policy': modify: ('dstip', 10.0.0.3) ('dstmac', 
00:00:00:00:00:03), 'infected':True, 'exempt': True}
fsm_policy:self.policy = if
    match:  ('srcip', 10.0.0.1)
then
    [DynamicPolicy]
    modify: ('dstip', 10.0.0.3) ('dstmac', 00:00:00:00:00:03)
else
    identity
 
Figure 16 – Policy is changed to redirect the traffic 
The redirection of traffic from host “h1”, it is perfectly visible in Figure 17, after we repeat the ping 
command. One can note  that the host replying to the ping is host “h3” instead of “h2”. As already 
explained, host “h3” is responsible to recover in terms of security any privileged hosts that by some 
reason become compromised. 
mininet> h1 ping -c 2 h2
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3 icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=115 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3 icmp_req=2 ttl=64 time=112 ms
--- 10.0.0.2 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1002ms
rtt min/avg/mdev = 112.492/114.106/115.720/1.614 ms
mininet>
 
Figure 17 – ICMP traffic is redirected 
After, some corrective actions performed in host “h1” by “h3”, one can assume that host “h1” has 
recovered. In this way, a new event is sent to the controller notifying host “h1” changed to the state of 
“not infected”, as follows: 
$ python json_sender.py -n infected -l False --flow="{srcip=10.0.0.1}" -a 
127.0.0.1 -p 50001 
Figure 18 illustrates some controller´s output informing that the last event was received and the 
forwarding policy changed to forward the traffic towards host “h2” (policy identity). 
match:  ('switch', 1) ('dstmac', 00:00:00:00:00:01)
then
    [DynamicPolicy]
    fwd 1
else
    flood on:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    switch   |    switch edges     |    egress ports                                                                |
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1           |                              | 1[2]---, 1[3]---, 1[1]---                                                  |
Received connection from ('127.0.0.1', 42145)
Received event infect is False related with flow {'srcip': 10.0.0.1}
fsm_policy:event_name= infected
fsm_policy:event_value= False
fsm_policy:event_state= {'policy': identity, 'infected': False, 'exempt': True}
fsm_policy:self.policy = if
    match:  ('srcip', 10.0.0.1)
then
    [DynamicPolicy]
    identity
else
    identity
 
Figure 18 – Policy returns back to traffic pass through (identity) 
From Figure 19 is possible to conclude that host “h1” is now receiving response from host “h2” itself.  
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3 icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=115 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.3 icmp_req=2 ttl=64 time=112 ms
--- 10.0.0.2 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1002ms
rtt min/avg/mdev = 112.492/114.106/115.720/1.614 ms
mininet> h1 ping -c 2 h2
PING 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.0.0.2 icmp_req=1 ttl=64 time=113 ms
64 bytes from 10.0.0.2 icmp_req=2 ttl=64 time=59.5 ms
--- 10.0.0.2 ping statistics ---
2 packets transmitted, 2 received, 0% packet loss, time 1001ms
rtt min/avg/mdev = 59.529/86.713/113.897/27.184 ms
mininet>
 
Figure 19 – ICMP traffic is reaching again host h2 
At this point, we finish our current evaluation of the intelligent IDS/IPS system. This is an important 
feature to be incoporated in Big Data scenarios once it facilitates the identification and solving of some 
attacks that a distributed Big Data architecture (in different phases of the Big Data lifecycle – from data 
capture to data processing and consumption) can suffer. 
BIG DATA SECURITY: FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Throughout this chapter it was possible to present some of the most important security and privacy 
challenges that affect Big Data projects and their specificities. Although the information security 
practices, methodologies and tools to ensure the security and privacy of the Big Data ecosystem already 
exist, the particular characteristics of Big Data make them ineffective if they are not used in an integrated 
manner. This chapter also presents some solutions for these challenges, but it does not provide a definitive 
solution for the problem. It rather points to some directions and technologies that might contribute to 
solve some of the most relevant and challenging Big Data security and privacy issues. 
Next, two different use cases were presented. Both of the use-cases present some directions that 
contribute to solving part of the large Big Data security and privacy puzzle. In the first use-case it was 
presented an approach that tries solving security and privacy issues on social network user generated 
content. In this approach, an open an interoperable rights management system was proposed as a way to 
improve the privacy of users that share content over social networks. The processes described show how 
the rights management system puts the end-users on the control of their own user-generated content, and 
how they prevent abuses from either other users or the social network platform itself. The second use-case 
presented the capabilities offered by SDN in increasing the ability to collect statistics data from the 
network and of allowing controller applications to actively program the forwarding devices, are powerful 
for proactive and smart security policy enforcement techniques such as active security (Hand, Ton, & 
Keller, 2013). This novel security methodology proposes a novel feedback loop to improve the control of 
defense mechanisms of a networked infrastructure, and is centered around five core capabilities: protect, 
sense, adjust, collect, counter (Kreutz et al., 2014). In this perspective, active security provides a 
centralized programming interface that simplifies the integration of mechanisms for detecting attacks, by 
i) collecting data from diverse sources (to identify attacks with more assertiveness), ii) converging to a 
consistent policy configuration for the security appliances, and iii) enforcing countermeasures to block or 
minimize the effect of such attacks. Previous aspects were partially covered by our IDS/IPS case study 
but notably need to be further developed and are an important contribution to the security and privacy of 
Big Data ecosystem. 
As noted throughout this chapter, although some important steps are being given towards solving Big 
Data security and privacy issues, there is still a long road ahead. In the conclusion of this chapter, the 
authors would like to refer some interesting topics where the research community could work actively to 
develop new Big Data security and privacy solutions. 
Research challenges in this Big Data ecosystem range from the data creation (and the Big Data sources - 
devices), data storage and transportation, data transformation and processing, and finally data usage. To 
support this lifecycle, a high capacity and highly distributed architecture will be necessary, exposed to an 
hostile environment subject to all kinds of attacks. The SDN approach as proposed on this chapter is a 
possible solution to counter these threats, however further research needs to be conducted, in particular on 
what concerns to automatic adaptation of switching and behavior-based security policies (P. Chen, 
Jorgen, & Yuan, 2011; Dohi & Uemura, 2012).  
There are also important research challenges on maintaining end to end data security and privacy. 
Ensuring that data is never revealed in clear, in particular to non-authorized parties, on any point of the 
Big Data lifecycle. Moving from data to programs, there are techniques for protecting privacy in 
browsing, searching, social interactions, and general usage through obfuscation methods. However, there 
is more research to be conducted on the processing of encrypted data and privacy protection in the context 
of both computer programs and web-based systems. 
More research challenges in the Big Data area include developing techniques to perform a transparent 
computations over encrypted data with multiple keys, from multiple sources and multiple users. In terms 
of research it would  be challenging to study and develop ways to delegate limited functions over 
encrypted data, so that third parties can analyze it. All the aspects related with key management, 
authorization delegation, management of rights, are topics that require further research in this field. 
When considering secure and private-aware system, trust is everything. In particular, in the case of Big 
Data, a trustworthy environment should be established for most of the scenarios (healthcare, assisted 
living, SCADA systems and many others). It is particularly challenging in terms of research directions 
how this environment can be attained. Trusting applications that are capable of querying and processing 
Big Data and extract knowledge from it and, trusting devices that collect all the data from multiple 
sources, constitute a basic security requirement. Understand how trust can be established among the end-
users, the devices (IoT) and the applications is a hot research topic for the coming years. 
On what concerns Big Data, these research challenges represent only the tip of the iceberg about the 
problems that still need to be studied and solved on the development of secure and privacy-aware Big 
Data ecosystem.  
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